It is 1980, a crisp november morning as you head to work. The streets are filled with others just like you. Taking their place at the morning kitchens, buffets, restaurants, starting their shifts at the hotel desks, welcoming early risers to a brand new day. Reminders of the holidays linger in the air and the hope of a good day of work begins to settle in.
You’re making your way through the hotel grounds, one of the grandest buildings on the Las Vegas strip, and just like usual you make your way through the deli. There's generally no one in the deli this early in the morning. Save a cook or two, prepping for the morning rush. No customers, clients or gamblers. It’s a dark and quiet path to your all too overstimulating job.A calm way to start the day.
It’s as you pass through the somber, shadow filled room, when you notice something out of the corner of your eye. The smell starts to tickle your nose, and you can feel a chill run through your bones and you come face to face with a force of nature. The primordial and mythical element that has been a part of humanity's evolution since prehistoric days. It's here, in the darked unused deli on your way to work that you notice the casino is on fire.
You call security, they ask if it’s bad enough to roll fire trucks. Looking at the screen of fire, rising from floor to ceiling, you witness a behemoth of untamed fury. Black smoke presses above and spreads out. Yes, get them going, you yell into the receiver as adrenaline hits. You run to a fire hose located on the other side of the wall, as you do a security officer meets you and you two quickly work together to break the security glass, fetch your hose and get water moving. But it's too late, the fire as spread.
Your last attempt to help, you run and grab an extinguisher and book it down the hall to get around the fire, to try a new angle. As you throw open the door to the otherside of the deli, you can feel pressure overtake your body. Your feet leave the ground and you're thrown back into the wall.
As you try to open your eyes and take a breath, you feel your lungs fill with toxic air. You see nothing but swirling black mist. You duck low, and the surreal moment of realization hits you; you’re now fighting for your life in a 26 story burning building.
On November 21, 1980, a catastrophic incident forever changed the landscape of fire safety and emergency response in the United States. The MGM Grand Fire, which occurred in Las Vegas, Nevada, claimed the lives of 85 people and left over 700 injured. This event exposed critical shortcomings in building design, fire safety regulations, and emergency preparedness, ultimately leading to significant reforms and improvements in fire safety practices nationwide.
Construction of the 26-story MGM Grand Hotel and Casino (currently Bally's) started in 1972 and it opened in December of 1973. There were 2,078 rooms at the hotel and the total area of the hotel and casino was approximately two million square feet. Fire sprinkler systems were not installed in the high-rise hotel, the casino (approximately 380 by 1200 feet, or 450,000 square feet), and the restaurant areas. Only partial fire sprinkler protection was provided for limited areas (arcade, showrooms and convention areas) on the
The building was of mixed construction. The high-rise portion was of fire resistive construction. While the low rise casino level consisted of both protected in unprotected non-combustible construction. The low rise portion included protected non-combustible construction; however, large areas of structural steel had either never been protected or, over the life of the building, the protection had been removed. Classification according to NFPA 220- 1979, standard on types of building construction, included both type 1 and type 2 construction. The high-rise construction consisted of structural steel protected with both reinforced concrete and gypsum wallboard. Most interior partitions were of gypsum wallboard on steel studs, including enclosures around the means of egress. In the low rise portion of the building, floors were concrete slab in partitions were of Gibson wallboard on steel studs, most partitions extended above the ceilings; however, in some cases there were openings in the partitions above the ceilings.
These openings facilitated return air movement for the heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems
The owners fought installing the fire sprinklers. The articles indicate that, despite receiving a recommendation letter from one of their own consultants, Orvin Engineering Company indicated "the liability of all the unsprinklered areas in this building should be a concern to your corporation." Fred Benninger (MGM chairman at the time) decided against installing the fire sprinklers.
The NFPA investigation said, "the determination of whether sprinklers were required or not was based on requirements of the uniform building code. Before 1976, casinos in Las Vegas were not considered "exhibition halls" and sprinklers are not required by the authority having jurisdiction. It could not be determined why certain areas were provided with sprinkler protection and others were not. Apparently the final determination was based on the hours of operation of the area in question. Those areas not operating on the 24-hour basis were required to have automatic sprinkler protection. Sprinklers were not required if the area is occupied around the clock. The deli was originally opened 24 hours a day and as a result sprinklers were not installed in this area"
It is believed that the most probable source of ignition in this fire was heat produced from electrical short circuiting of an ungrounded conductor to a flexible metal conduit. This occurred in wiring within a combustible concealed space on the west side of a pie case in a waitresses serving station along the south wall of the deli. Again, just going to repeat that this was because of a pie case. The first materials ignited included plywood used to enclose the pie case. The fire most likely smoldered for a period of time before breaking out of the concealed space and into the deli serving station at approximately 7:05 to 7:10 a.m.
Once open, flaming in the serving station took place, the fire began spreading on lightweight fuel such as plastic, paper and combustibles in the interior finish. Initially, smoke moved directly from the serving station through a transfer grill to the return air plenum above the ceiling. Full involvement in the serving station and then the deli along with the lack of adequate fire barriers allowed the transfer of heat and smoke into the casino. A flame front moved through the casino and it became heavily involved. Consuming combustible furnishings, contents, and interior finish. The presence of fuel, air supply and a very large undivided area allowed for rapid fire spread and heavy smoke production.
The thick black smoke and toxic fumes, along with the absence of sprinkler systems, hindered rescue efforts and evacuation procedures.
Seismic joint shafts and elevator hoistways contributed to smoke movement into and throughout the high-rise tower. These shafts and hoists allowed smoke to move through the entire building all the way up to the 26th floor utilizing the plenum space to move around the building. All three of the interior stairways were enclosed with construction that did not have to our fire resistant rating. In addition, there were non-rated access panels that allowed smoke and heat to spread into the stairwells at least one of them. The smoke proof towers of W2 was enclosed with polywood at the bottom which burned through allowing smoke to spread through W-2 which completely negates having the fire resistance stuff throughout the rest of the stairwell.
The HVAC systems operated during the entire fire and actually contributed to smoke spread throughout the high-rise tower. The equipment as far as could be determined was not equipped with smoke detectors that were arranged to shut down the systems and some fire dampers were even arranged so that they would not close when fuse will links were melted so that air would still pass through and a lot of these systems were utilized to bring air into the rooms of the hotels which meant it was bringing smoke and heat directly into the rooms.
Smoke spread through the elevator hoist ways of the high-rise tower. Several elevator cars were stopped slightly above or below the casino level and two cars fell, again...Two cars fell below the casino floor. Door openings at the lobby level allowed smoke to spread into the hoist ways and smoke movement into the high-rise floors in the elevator lobby areas.
The consequences of the fire were devastating, not only in terms of human loss but also in revealing the vulnerabilities of the existing fire safety regulations and practices.
The life safety exposure included fire spread throughout the casino, following full involvement of the deli and a heavy smoke exposure throughout the high-rise hotel tower. 17 victims were located on the casino level, even though they said that the The casino floor area did a fantastic job of stopping the spread because of the automatic sprinklers that were involved, but they just were not enough because of the spread around the entire casino.
61 victims located in the high-rise tower were among those exposed to untenable smoke conditions in rooms, corridors, stairways and elevator lobbies. 10 of the 78 casino level and high-rise victims were located in elevators and various floors. As determined by the Clark county coroner, all high rise victims and 14 of the casino level. Victims died of smoke and carbon monoxide inhalation. Three casino level victims died of burns and carbon monoxide inhalation; one person who jumped or fell died of massive head injuries.
Some 600 persons were injured and required medical attention. The evacuation of the high-rise tower required about 4 hours. Some occupants evacuated early in the fire and others in later stages with firefighter assistance. An estimated 300 persons were evacuated by helicopter from the roof of the high-rise tower. The NFPA human behavior study shows that majority of the study shows that majority of the study population evacuated over stairways. Fable favorable factors in the MGM helicopter evacuation operation include clean weather, daylight hours and an unusual availability of the participating Air Force.
You’re making your way through the hotel grounds, one of the grandest buildings on the Las Vegas strip, and just like usual you make your way through the deli. There's generally no one in the deli this early in the morning. Save a cook or two, prepping for the morning rush. No customers, clients or gamblers. It’s a dark and quiet path to your all too overstimulating job.A calm way to start the day.
It’s as you pass through the somber, shadow filled room, when you notice something out of the corner of your eye. The smell starts to tickle your nose, and you can feel a chill run through your bones and you come face to face with a force of nature. The primordial and mythical element that has been a part of humanity's evolution since prehistoric days. It's here, in the darked unused deli on your way to work that you notice the casino is on fire.
You call security, they ask if it’s bad enough to roll fire trucks. Looking at the screen of fire, rising from floor to ceiling, you witness a behemoth of untamed fury. Black smoke presses above and spreads out. Yes, get them going, you yell into the receiver as adrenaline hits. You run to a fire hose located on the other side of the wall, as you do a security officer meets you and you two quickly work together to break the security glass, fetch your hose and get water moving. But it's too late, the fire as spread.
Your last attempt to help, you run and grab an extinguisher and book it down the hall to get around the fire, to try a new angle. As you throw open the door to the otherside of the deli, you can feel pressure overtake your body. Your feet leave the ground and you're thrown back into the wall.
As you try to open your eyes and take a breath, you feel your lungs fill with toxic air. You see nothing but swirling black mist. You duck low, and the surreal moment of realization hits you; you’re now fighting for your life in a 26 story burning building.
On November 21, 1980, a catastrophic incident forever changed the landscape of fire safety and emergency response in the United States. The MGM Grand Fire, which occurred in Las Vegas, Nevada, claimed the lives of 85 people and left over 700 injured. This event exposed critical shortcomings in building design, fire safety regulations, and emergency preparedness, ultimately leading to significant reforms and improvements in fire safety practices nationwide.
Construction of the 26-story MGM Grand Hotel and Casino (currently Bally's) started in 1972 and it opened in December of 1973. There were 2,078 rooms at the hotel and the total area of the hotel and casino was approximately two million square feet. Fire sprinkler systems were not installed in the high-rise hotel, the casino (approximately 380 by 1200 feet, or 450,000 square feet), and the restaurant areas. Only partial fire sprinkler protection was provided for limited areas (arcade, showrooms and convention areas) on the
The building was of mixed construction. The high-rise portion was of fire resistive construction. While the low rise casino level consisted of both protected in unprotected non-combustible construction. The low rise portion included protected non-combustible construction; however, large areas of structural steel had either never been protected or, over the life of the building, the protection had been removed. Classification according to NFPA 220- 1979, standard on types of building construction, included both type 1 and type 2 construction. The high-rise construction consisted of structural steel protected with both reinforced concrete and gypsum wallboard. Most interior partitions were of gypsum wallboard on steel studs, including enclosures around the means of egress. In the low rise portion of the building, floors were concrete slab in partitions were of Gibson wallboard on steel studs, most partitions extended above the ceilings; however, in some cases there were openings in the partitions above the ceilings.
These openings facilitated return air movement for the heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems
The owners fought installing the fire sprinklers. The articles indicate that, despite receiving a recommendation letter from one of their own consultants, Orvin Engineering Company indicated "the liability of all the unsprinklered areas in this building should be a concern to your corporation." Fred Benninger (MGM chairman at the time) decided against installing the fire sprinklers.
The NFPA investigation said, "the determination of whether sprinklers were required or not was based on requirements of the uniform building code. Before 1976, casinos in Las Vegas were not considered "exhibition halls" and sprinklers are not required by the authority having jurisdiction. It could not be determined why certain areas were provided with sprinkler protection and others were not. Apparently the final determination was based on the hours of operation of the area in question. Those areas not operating on the 24-hour basis were required to have automatic sprinkler protection. Sprinklers were not required if the area is occupied around the clock. The deli was originally opened 24 hours a day and as a result sprinklers were not installed in this area"
It is believed that the most probable source of ignition in this fire was heat produced from electrical short circuiting of an ungrounded conductor to a flexible metal conduit. This occurred in wiring within a combustible concealed space on the west side of a pie case in a waitresses serving station along the south wall of the deli. Again, just going to repeat that this was because of a pie case. The first materials ignited included plywood used to enclose the pie case. The fire most likely smoldered for a period of time before breaking out of the concealed space and into the deli serving station at approximately 7:05 to 7:10 a.m.
Once open, flaming in the serving station took place, the fire began spreading on lightweight fuel such as plastic, paper and combustibles in the interior finish. Initially, smoke moved directly from the serving station through a transfer grill to the return air plenum above the ceiling. Full involvement in the serving station and then the deli along with the lack of adequate fire barriers allowed the transfer of heat and smoke into the casino. A flame front moved through the casino and it became heavily involved. Consuming combustible furnishings, contents, and interior finish. The presence of fuel, air supply and a very large undivided area allowed for rapid fire spread and heavy smoke production.
The thick black smoke and toxic fumes, along with the absence of sprinkler systems, hindered rescue efforts and evacuation procedures.
Seismic joint shafts and elevator hoistways contributed to smoke movement into and throughout the high-rise tower. These shafts and hoists allowed smoke to move through the entire building all the way up to the 26th floor utilizing the plenum space to move around the building. All three of the interior stairways were enclosed with construction that did not have to our fire resistant rating. In addition, there were non-rated access panels that allowed smoke and heat to spread into the stairwells at least one of them. The smoke proof towers of W2 was enclosed with polywood at the bottom which burned through allowing smoke to spread through W-2 which completely negates having the fire resistance stuff throughout the rest of the stairwell.
The HVAC systems operated during the entire fire and actually contributed to smoke spread throughout the high-rise tower. The equipment as far as could be determined was not equipped with smoke detectors that were arranged to shut down the systems and some fire dampers were even arranged so that they would not close when fuse will links were melted so that air would still pass through and a lot of these systems were utilized to bring air into the rooms of the hotels which meant it was bringing smoke and heat directly into the rooms.
Smoke spread through the elevator hoist ways of the high-rise tower. Several elevator cars were stopped slightly above or below the casino level and two cars fell, again...Two cars fell below the casino floor. Door openings at the lobby level allowed smoke to spread into the hoist ways and smoke movement into the high-rise floors in the elevator lobby areas.
The consequences of the fire were devastating, not only in terms of human loss but also in revealing the vulnerabilities of the existing fire safety regulations and practices.
The life safety exposure included fire spread throughout the casino, following full involvement of the deli and a heavy smoke exposure throughout the high-rise hotel tower. 17 victims were located on the casino level, even though they said that the The casino floor area did a fantastic job of stopping the spread because of the automatic sprinklers that were involved, but they just were not enough because of the spread around the entire casino.
61 victims located in the high-rise tower were among those exposed to untenable smoke conditions in rooms, corridors, stairways and elevator lobbies. 10 of the 78 casino level and high-rise victims were located in elevators and various floors. As determined by the Clark county coroner, all high rise victims and 14 of the casino level. Victims died of smoke and carbon monoxide inhalation. Three casino level victims died of burns and carbon monoxide inhalation; one person who jumped or fell died of massive head injuries.
Some 600 persons were injured and required medical attention. The evacuation of the high-rise tower required about 4 hours. Some occupants evacuated early in the fire and others in later stages with firefighter assistance. An estimated 300 persons were evacuated by helicopter from the roof of the high-rise tower. The NFPA human behavior study shows that majority of the study shows that majority of the study population evacuated over stairways. Fable favorable factors in the MGM helicopter evacuation operation include clean weather, daylight hours and an unusual availability of the participating Air Force.
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